In the February 2026 column, Lee Finch considers the potential impact of the decision in Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33 in the context of mortgage brokers and fiduciary duties.
Introduction
Arguments that mortgage brokers owe fiduciary duties long pre‑date the motor finance litigation in Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33. While the theory as applied to motor dealers was, at the very least, ambitious and has now been decisively rejected by the Supreme Court, its application to mortgage brokers has always been more plausible. Mortgage brokers, unlike motor dealers, commonly charge fees to borrowers and do not act as counterparties selling their own assets.
Before the Supreme Court decision, there was a line of Court of Appeal decisions in which mortgage brokers were held to be fiduciaries (Wilson and another v Hurstanger Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 299; McWilliam v Norton Finance UK) Ltd t/a Norton Finance [2015] EWCA Civ 186; and Wood v Commercial Business Ltd and Pengelly v Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc [2021] EWCA Civ 471). Similar decisions were also made in respect of other brokers (for example, investment brokers: Medsted Associates Ltd v Canaccord GenuityWealth (International) Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 83).
Against that backdrop, defendants rarely contested fiduciary status. Instead, litigation focused on containment strategies:
- Whether disclosure rendered commissions merely “half secret”.
- Whether rescission should be refused as disproportionate.
- Whether lenders could be liable as accessories absent dishonesty.
That landscape has shifted materially post-Hopcraft.
For a case report on Hopcroft, see Legal update, Undisclosed commissions in motor finance: Supreme Court rules on fiduciary duties and unfair relationships.
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